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LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATURAL RESOURCE 











  The sustainability of natural resource management depends not only on 
appropriate technology and prices, but also upon the institutions involved in resource 
management at the local level.  Heavy state involvement in natural resource management 
has been justified based on the prevalence of market failures, notably the positive and 
negative externalities and the strategic importance of the resources. Policies of devolving 
management responsibility from the state to users have become increasingly widespread 
in response to the performance deficiencies of government agencies, the fiscal crisis of 
the state, and broader policies of decentralization.  The success of these policies depends 
upon the local capacity for collective action, but the factors that encourage or inhibit the 
collective action are insufficiently understood. 
 
  This discussion paper aims to identify factors which condition local organization 
for resource management.  It draws upon a review of two major bodies of literature:  
empirical analyses of forestry, fisheries, grazing, and irrigation management, and game 
theory literature.  The empirical literature on resource management highlights the 
physical and technical characteristics of the resource, the characteristics of the group of 
users, and the attributes of institutional arrangements as key factors affecting the 
management capacity of local organizations.  Simplistic game theory has often been used 
to predict a "tragedy of the commons" for natural resources, but more refined versions 
provide insights into the role of communication, group size, time horizons, trust, and 
social norms in supporting collective action. 
 
  The evidence on voluntary organization indicates that collective management is 
often a viable alternative to nationalization or privatization of natural resources.  
Although local organizations will not be able to solve every collective action problem, in 
many situations they could be at least as effective as other management agencies. 
Knowledge of the factors which condition local organization should be used to develop 









1.  Introduction.................................................................................................................... 1 
 
2.  Impetus for Examining Local Organizations................................................................. 3 
 
3.  Defining Local Organizations for Natural Resource Management ............................... 5 
 
4.  Insight from Analyses of Empirical Studies.................................................................. 8 
 
5.  Insight from Collective Action and Game Theory Literature...................................... 17 
 
6.  Gaps in the Literature................................................................................................... 23 
 




   
LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: 
LESSONS FROM THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
 
Lise Nordvig Rasmussen





1.  INTRODUCTION 
Resource degradation problems in a number of sectors--including forestry, 
fisheries, grazing, and irrigation--have received increasing attention in recent years.  
Concepts of sustainable natural resource management (NRM) as only a technical-
ecological matter on the one hand, or an economic issue, on the other, have been shown 
to be too simplistic.  If either approach were sufficient, natural resource degradation 
problems would be relatively easy to solve.  The persistence of these problems, and the 
failure of simple technological or economic "fixes" demonstrate the need to look at more 
complex aspects of resource management.  There is thus growing recognition of the 
centrality of social actors, their institutions and organizations when exploring natural 
resource management issues.  Voluntary organizations at the local level which provide a 
source of collective resource management are receiving particular attention, as an 
alternative to state management on one side, or private management on the other. 
The primary aim of this discussion paper is to identify factors which condition 
local organization for natural resource management.  The attention given to this issue 
is based on the premise that an understanding of the factors which affect local 
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organization for natural resource management is essential for making improvements in 
the outcome of natural resource management practices. 
The examination of this key issue in this paper is based on selected pieces from 
the enormous body of existing literature in this field.  The empirical literature has seen a 
rapid growth in the number of case studies exploring management of various natural 
resources, from varying disciplinary perspectives, particularly in the past decade.  For 
example, Martin’s (1992) bibliography on common pool resources and collective action 
alone holds 7250 citations.  The theoretical literature, particularly game theory, is also 
growing.  In this paper, we focus on the literature that attempts to synthesize theoretical 
as well as empirical findings, rather than individual case studies.  It draws from work 
relating to a range of natural resources, including water (especially irrigation), fisheries, 
forestry, and grazing land, with emphasis on the common lessons that apply across the 
different types of resources.  Thus, a second purpose of this paper is to serve as an 
overview and guide to the literature in this field. 
The paper is structured as follows: the second section examines the impetus for 
studying local organizations, particularly the through recent policy trends.  The third 
section defines key terms related to local organizations for natural resource management.  
The fourth section focuses on the key factors which empirical studies have identified as 
influencing such organizations.  The conclusions regarding determinants of local 
organization that can be reached on the base of the theoretical literature, and game theory 
in particular, are presented in the fifth section.  The sixth section identifies the key gaps 
which remain to be addressed, particularly to improve the basis for policy change.  The   3
final section points to the convergence between theoretical and empirical literature, as 
well as to limitations of each, and indicates areas for further research. 
 
2.  IMPETUS FOR EXAMINING LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS 
Heavy state involvement in natural resource management has been justified based 
on the prevalence of market failures, notably the positive and negative externalities and 
the strategic importance of the resources.  The current emphasis on user groups and local 
management as an alternative to state control over such resources has its roots in both 
academic studies and policy pressures.  From the late 1970s on, there has been an 
increasing number of field studies of user-managed resource systems, which suggested 
that government management was not the only (nor even always the best) option.  Since 
the mid-1980s there has been greater attention to management of common pool resources 
in the theoretical literature (e.g. Bromley 1992; National Academy of Sciences 1986; 
Ostrom 1990; Runge 1986).  These studies have argued that local management by users 
does not necessarily lead to a "tragedy of commons", provided there are effective local 
organizations. 
On the policy side there has been a growing awareness of the performance 
deficiencies of many government agencies in managing resources at the local level.  The 
fiscal crisis of the state, combined with structural adjustment programs, have created 
pressures to reduce subsidies to agencies, and look for alternatives.  Devolving 
management responsibility to local organizations has therefore been seen as increasingly 
attractive.     4
Initiatives such as turnover of irrigation systems from state agencies to water user 
associations, or joint forest management to involve local communities along with state 
agencies, are being implemented on a broad scale in many countries.  These are based 
upon the assumptions that local organizations will exist or emerge to take on 
management functions.  But for these efforts to succeed, a better understanding of the 
factors affecting LOs, and of the types of policy changes which facilitate their 
development, is required. 
Several current development themes intersect and contribute to the growing 
interest in LOs on the part of donor agencies and national governments.  One of the 
clearest themes is improving natural resource management.  But a broader theme is 
decentralization, or "rolling back the boundaries of the state" to improve the 
management of natural and fiscal resources.  This applies to both administrative 
decentralization which attempts to move decision-making authority down to the local 
level, and to financial decentralization which aims to shift responsibility for payment 
down to local entities, particularly users.  LOs can facilitate both types of decentralization 
by providing a local entity for decision-making and resource mobilization.  Interest in 
privatization to improve financial performance and cost recovery likewise leads to 
dealing with LOs because, in the majority of situations in developing countries, it is 
administratively unfeasible for each individual to operate independently in natural 
resource management.  Finally, the themes of participation and democratization stress 
the involvement of citizens affected by programs, for social goals of  empowering local 
people as well as goals of improving program performance.  For these, LOs offer an 
organized forum for communication and local input.    5
 
3.  DEFINING LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR NATURAL RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT  
  Managing the natural resources is increasingly viewed as a process in 
which the organization forms the central unit of interaction (Coward 1980).   Figure 1 
presents a simple, short-run conceptual framework for examining the processes and 
relationships between local organizations and the environment.  The mode of 
organization varies as a result of the condition of external factors (independent variables).  
The mode of organization and the pattern of interaction within the organization, in turn, 
affect the resource management outcome.  Identification of factors which condition the 
local organization, and of the types of organizations which facilitate sustainable natural 
resource management, are important for policies to assist local organizations.  However, 
confusion between the organizations and the outcome in terms of resource management 
should be avoided.  Organizations are not, in general, an end in themselves, but a means 
of improving the management of the resource.   6





Levels of action (decision making and activity) can be conceived as a continuum 
ranging from the international level in the one end to individual level in the other.  Local 
organizations are those which operate somewhere in between, above the household and 
below the regional and national levels (Uphoff 608-609). 
It is possible to distinguish between three sectors where natural resource 
management can take place: 
•  the private sector; 
•  the collective action sector; and 
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These three sectors differ, among other things, by the assignment of property 
rights and the incentives of compliance which make people cooperate. Property rights in 
the private sector are assigned to individuals, in the collective action to groups, and in the 
public sector to the state.  In the private sector utility is the primary incentive for 
cooperation; in the collective action sector cooperation is based on normative-voluntary 
incentives, and in the public sector the cooperation is enforced, with sanctions and 
penalties as the primary incentives.  The different management sectors can also be 
perceived as a continuum, with the private sector on one end and the public sector on the 
other.  In between these two poles we find the collective action sector, in which local 
organizations provide resource management (Esman & Uphoff 1980: 20-21; Uphoff 
1993: 612-614). 
If property rights are completely absent, there will be open access to the use of 
resource (Bromley 1992).  Under open access, no one has responsibility for resource 
management, and there is little to prevent "free riders" from exploiting the resource 
without contributing to its maintenance (though some individuals or "privileged groups" 
may provide maintenance services, if the benefits are great enough).  The difference 
between an open access situation and the three management systems mentioned above is 
essential for correct interpretation of situations and policies.  Failure to distinguish 
between common property and open access situations has led to more than intellectual 
confusion: it has also contributed to mistaken policies of privatization of resources, on the 
one hand, or state take-over of resources on the other.   
If the two continua of international to individual levels and private to state 
management are seen as intersecting at right angles (as illustrated in Figure 2), local   8
organizations for NRM occupy the central position.  Empirical cases of management 
entities can then be placed at different points, depending on the composition of incentives 
and levels at which they operate.  For example, local governments would be state sector 
and local level, while multinational timber companies might be represented as private 
sector and international level.  In practice, a given resource may be affected by a 
combination of management entities such as private individuals, local organizations, 
national regulatory agencies, and even international trading firms, but it is useful to 
consider the incentive structure and level of operation of each. 
 
4.  INSIGHT FROM ANALYSES OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
  There are a large number of case studies examining local organizations for 
natural resource management from various disciplinary perspectives. Following in the 
wake of the  "Conference on Common Pool Resource Management" held by the National 
Academy of Science in 1985 (see proceedings from the conference: National Academy of 
Science 1986), there have been great efforts to synthesize the findings from these case 




































































































































































































































































































































   10
 
The factors identified in the literature which condition local organization can be 
divided into three categories of variables (Tang 1992; Uphoff 1986): 
•   physical and technical characteristics of the resource; 
•   characteristics of the group of users; 
•  attributes of institutional arrangements. 
The relative importance of these factors as determinants is likely to depend on 
local conditions.  Specific dimensions of each of these which have been discussed in the 
literature are explained in the following discussion.  A summary of the factors identified 
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PHYSICAL AND TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESOURCE 
The degree of excludability and subtractability or rivalry of the resource have been 
stressed by numerous authors as characteristics used to distinguish the type of the resource.  
Excludability relates to the cost of preventing others from using the resource, while 
subtractability refers to situations in which use of the resource by one individual reduces the 
amount available to others.  Resources which have high excludability can be managed 
efficiently as private property; those with low excludability but also low subtractability are 
public goods which the state can provide; but those with low excludability and high 
subtractability are common pool resources, which are most susceptible to degradation 
through the "tragedy of the commons" if management entities are lacking.  Excludability and 
subtractability, in turn, are influenced by the size of the resource system and the natural 
boundedness of the resource  (Oakerson 1986; Uphoff 1986; Vermillion 1991: 20; Ostrom 
1992b: 295-96).  The technology used for the withdrawing of resources and for enclosing 
will, according to Wade (1988) and Ostrom (1990), affect the possibility of interaction 
between the individuals as well.  These factors are essential to the flow or supply of the 
resource, which can be described by the extent of predictability in quantity, over time and 
space (Bromley and Cernea 1989, Ostrom 1990; Tang 1992). 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GROUP OF USERS  
This category focuses primarily on the sociological characteristics of the group of 
users.  First of all the users’ demand for, dependence on, and knowledge of the resource 
are important factors in terms of characteristics of the group which increases incentives for 
organization for NRM (Uphoff, Wickramasinghe and Wijayaratna 1990; Wade 1988). - 13 - 
 
The number of users in the resource system has also considerable effect on the 
possibility of voluntary organization.  The general hypothesis claims that with an increasing 
number of participants, the possibility of voluntary organization will decrease (Bardhan 
1993; Nugent 1993; Ostrom 1990; Bromley 1992).  One of the arguments which has been 
used to support this hypothesis is that the smaller the group, the more homogeneous the 
interests of the members are likely to be.  According to this argument degree of 
homogeneity becomes an intermediate variable between size of the group and degree of 
organization.  This intermediate variable is positively linked to the dependent variable.  In a 
natural resource management context it is not surprising that similarity in, for example, 
resource access and perceptions of the risk of the long-term resource exploitation will 
enhance the possibility of cooperation (Ostrom 1992b: 229).  But also the consistency in 
norms in general has been identified as a crucial factor affecting the degree of organization 
(Nugent 1993; Bardhan 1993; White and Runge; Ostrom; 1990). 
Though homogeneity is identified by several authors as an important factor 
facilitating organization, Baland & Platteau (1994: 273-284) question the validity of this 
relationship.  Ostrom (1986; 1992) makes the same point, claiming that heterogeneity in asset 
structure can actually favor the possibility of organization, particularly where there is a need 
for leadership and entrepreneurship. 
The existence of voluntary organizations is facilitated by the proximity of the 
residence of the users to each other as well as the proximity of the residence of the users and 
the location of the resource (Wade 1988; Ostrom 1990).  Also the extent of interaction and 
organizational experiences or density in other types of activity than natural resource - 14 - 
 
management and the expectations about the time horizon of the activity are hypothesized to 
be positively related to the possibility organization for NRM (Ostrom 1990; Cernea 1993). 
Finally the openness and stability of the community in general is a crucial 
determinant of cooperating.  The higher the rate of migration, mobility, and market 
integration, the lower the possibility of voluntary cooperation or organization (Baland and 
Platteau 1994; Bardhan 1993; Ostrom 1990). 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS  
In identifying and examining the determinants of local organizations, the issue of the 
institutional arrangements has received a great deal of attention.  It is useful to distinguish 
between three levels of institutional arrangements: operational rules, collective choice rules, 
and constitutional rules. 
The operational rules directly affect the use of the resource:  who can participate, 
what the participants may, must and must not do (permit, require, and forbid), and how they 
are rewarded and punished.  Rules can be either formal or informal shared understandings.  
The content of the following five categories of operational rules are important for the 
possibility of organization: 
•  boundary and access rules defining the resource system in terms of area   and 
members; 
 
•     allocation rules--who is getting what; 
•     input rules--in what way the users contribute; 
•     penalty rules--monitoring and sanctioning; 
•     conflict resolution rules or mechanisms. - 15 - 
 
The presence of operational rules will not in itself tell anything about the possible 
degree of organization.  However, if the rules can be described by a high degree of 
simplicity, flexibility and fairness, it seems to enhance the possibility of local organization 
for natural resource management (Baland & Platteau 1994: 265-267). 
The collective choice rules give guidelines for formulating, changing and enforcing 
operational rules (Tang 1992).  These rules define who is eligible and how the future 
operational rules will be made (Ostrom 1990: 141-142).  Veto rights to individuals or groups 
are an example of such collective choice rules (Oakerson 1992).  The extent of participation 
of the individuals affected by the operational rules has been emphasized as a crucial factor at 
this level of institutional arrangements. 
At the third level, constitutional rules are defined both internally and externally.  In 
local organizations the collective and constitutional rules are difficult to separate.   
The external arrangements include any public regulation of relevance, such as 
property rights, delegation of decision-making competence to the local level, rights of 
reorganization, environmental and natural resource regulation.  Also market arrangements 
and, consequently, economic conditions within which the natural resource management takes 
place have importance for the level of organizational activity (Oakerson 1992).  The form of 
the relationship between external arrangements and degree of organization will depend on the 
specific content of the former.  Generally the external authorities’ recognition of local 
practices and norms are emphasized as facilitating effective local NRM (Wade 1988; 
Bromley and Cernea 1989; Bardhan 1993; Ostrom 1990).  Local organization becomes easier 
when the arrangements in the external environment are supporting the process. - 16 - 
 
Finally, it has been argued that organizational activity will be positively affected by 
links to other organizations.  Uphoff (1991) points out the importance of both horizontal and 
vertical linkages.  In other words, existing organizations seem to be better off if they are a 
part of a larger organizational system than if they are performing in isolation (Uphoff 1991: 
496).  Similarly Ostrom (1990) finds the use of "nested enterprises" constituted of a number 
of organizations on different levels to be a design principle for stable natural resource 
management in more complex systems.  
Figure 3 summarizes the relationships among the variables that affect local 
organization.  Broken lines are used to illustrate the dynamics and complexity of 
organizational changes. 
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At this stage of the analysis it is essential to draw attention to the interaction among the 
three factors conditioning local organizations.  Some aspects - such as "ecological stress" or 
scarcity of the resource - can only be understood as a result of interaction among factors 
from all three categories (e.g., supply of the resource, the user’s dependence or reliance on 
the resource, and operational rules regulating access to the resource). 
While the hypotheses generated from comparisons of case study material are rich, this 
methodology for studying organizations for NRM has a serious drawback in the lack of 
rigorous indicators through which degree of organization can be studied as a dependent 
variable.  In the empirical case studies, the analysis of the organizational variable is usually 
approached in a rather descriptive and qualitative way.  If the issue of indicators of 
organizational activity is discussed explicitly, the discussion is often fairly abstract.  Thus, 
there is still a great need for development of such indicators.  Existing case studies can be 
used to identify indicators in an inductive and systematic manner, as has been done in 
identifying determinants of organization.  Such indicators are needed to test hypotheses about 
the determinants of organization, as well as to test the relationship between local 
organizations and natural resource management outcomes. 
 
5.  INSIGHT FROM COLLECTIVE ACTION AND GAME THEORY LITERATURE  
 
The growing body of game theory has been used extensively to address the question 
of whether or not individuals are capable of cooperation and will choose to cooperate and 
organize voluntarily.  In this literature, the choice the individual confronts is generally 
viewed as a comparison of expected benefits and costs of alternative choices of actions, with 
the economic concepts of costs and benefits defined rather abstractly (Oakerson 1992: 49). - 18 - 
 
Numerous games have been developed, starting from the classical Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Game.  This game has, to a great extend, been the underlying argument for the 
pessimism on cooperation within the natural resource management literature (Bardhan 1993: 
634; Feeny, Berkes, McCay, and Acheson 1990; Ostrom 1990).  The application of other 
games to NRM situations leads to more optimiistic views.  While a full discussion of this 
literature is beyond the scope of this paper, we focus on the assumptions which are made in 
the different games, in order to identify the factors which are expected to condition 
cooperation and organization. 
THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA GAME  
Hardin’s widely recognized "The Tragedy of the Commons" (Hardin 1968) can be 
formalized into a classical Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game.
1  In a 1-shot version of this game 
the players face a payoff structure which implies a dominant strategy of defection or 
noncooperation, and makes unlikely the possibility of voluntary organization.  From an 
individual standpoint this choice of strategy in a 1-shot PD game is rational, but it becomes 
irrational from an overall view.  Everybody would be better off if they cooperated instead of 
defected. 
Consequently the PD game has been used as an argument for nationalization as well 
as privatization of natural resources.  The former is based on the argument that the original 
payoff structure in the PD game can be changed by the state in such a way that cooperation 
becomes a dominant strategy.  For example, regulations and penalties can create a new pay-
off structure that encourages people to cooperate (Ostrom 1990: 8-12).  This, however, 
                                                 
1  The PD is presented in several sources. See for example Ostrom (1990: 2-14); Feeny, 
Berkes, McCay, and Acheson (1990: 1-3); Baland and Platteau (1993: 17-28). - 19 - 
 
assumes that the state (and its representatives) has proper motivation, sufficient knowledge, 
and enforcement ability to provide optimal resource management.  It ignores the need for 
extensive local information for monitoring and enforcing regulations, in which the state has 
no comparative advantage, and problems caused by rent-seeking by agency staff who have 
low incentives to successfully manage the resource. 
On the other side, the "property rights school" argues that the existence of a set of 
well defined property rights is the most appropriate way to make individuals internalize the 
externalities and thus avoid resource degradation.  It even argues that the institution of 
private property will emerge spontaneously whenever a cost-benefit comparison makes it 
appear as more desirable than any other system (Baland & Platteau 1994: 29-30).  This 
approach is premised upon the existence of complete and perfect markets, including futures 
markets.  In practice, such conditions are often absent for many natural resources in 
developing countries, where information and bargaining asymmetries, high transactions 
costs, and non-divisibility of the resource violate the assumptions of the property rights 
school. 
 
GAMES IN FAVOR OF COOPERATION  
The structure of the PD game is highly artificial, and does not represent the 
conditions actually faced by individuals in most NRM situations.  A number of alternative 
games have been applied by those who believe that the constellation of costs and benefits of 
collective action on natural resources is often of a kind which is much more favorable to the 
possibility of cooperation than the PD game predicts (Bardhan 1993: 634; Nugent 1993: 
624).  These games take into account the interactions between individuals.  Theorists such as - 20 - 
 
Axelrod (1984), Elster (1989), Runge (1986), and Taylor (1988) have argued that if certain 
conditions are present, the players will face a payoff structure which makes voluntary 
cooperation possible, even desirable.  The major game structures which support this 
conclusion are: 
   Chicken Game (CG) 
   Assurance Game (AG) 
   Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) with tit-for-tat strategy 
   Fairness Game (FG) 
 
Despite the similarity of the conclusions drawn by these authors, it is important to 
note that the games they are referring to are not the same.  The assumptions that are made 
and the factors which have been identified to condition organization differ in the games.  
Rather than discussing these differences in any detail, this paper focuses on identifying 
factors which determine organization, particularly the variation along two fundamental 
variables: size of the group and the time horizon of the game situation and analysis.  
The Chicken Game (CG) is the simplest of the four games.  It describes a one-shot 
situation in which at least one of the players will cooperate simply because both players want 
to avoid a dominant strategy of defection--which is the least favorable strategy in terms of 
comparison of costs and benefits (see Taylor 1988).  Each player would rather cooperate than 
have universal defection, but given the cooperation of the other, each player has an incentive 
to defect.  Therefore, the worst possible outcome is averted, but universal cooperation is also 
not achieved. 
The Assurance Game (AG) is a coordination game.  In this game the payoff structure 
the players face is not as favorable as in the CG, and each player prefers symmetric solutions - 21 - 
 
(see Runge 1981; 1984).  Thus, universal cooperation or universal defection are possible 
equilibriums.  Accordingly there is no dominant strategy.  Under these circumstances the 
degree of communication between players will be a crucial to the possibility of cooperation 
or organization.  Extension of the AG to multi-player games assumes that each player will 
only choose to cooperate if at least a critical mass of the other players is doing the same.  
Thus catalysts can play an important role in getting cooperation started.  Furthermore the 
choice of action will depend on the mutual expectations and at last the degree of trust of 
the members of the group (Baland & Platteau 1994; Runge 1984).   
The more complex dynamic analysis of the repeated games appear to be most useful 
for identifying factors of organization.  The Tit-for-tat strategy (TS) of cooperation is a result 
of a repeated PD game situation.  If cooperation gets started, it will be reciprocated 
(Axelrod 1984; Nugent 1993:625), as each player plays whatever the previous player played.  
The argument is that "each player accumulates experience of the behavior of his opponent 
since he meets him personally at each round of the game and is able to recall his past moves" 
(Baland and Platteau 1994: 101).  In other words, according to the Tit-for-tat strategy, an 
organization can emerge and be maintained if there the group is small, there is in the 
beginning a willingness to give the cooperation a trial, and certain stability of the group 
which allows the continuous interacting for a longer period of time between the same 
members.
2  Unlike the AG, the choice of the players in dynamic games will not only build on 
expectations but also on observed past behavior (Bardhan 1993: 635). 
                                                 
2  While most of the results in game theory depend on infinite time horizon games, they  often 
reproducible in finite games with uncertain horizons, i.e. games in which the players are 
uncertain when the game ends. - 22 - 
 
In other dynamic game strategies such as the Fairness Game (FG), the importance of 
social norms has been identified as a crucial factor determining organization.  In particular, 
Elster (1993:101) highlights the role of the "’Norm of fairness’: cooperate if and only if most 
other people cooperate."  In FG there will be a dominant strategy of cooperation, and the 
argument is that the players will not hesitate to cooperate because they know that, if they do 
so, the other players will follow suit. 
On the basis of the discussion of CG, AG, TS, and FG in the literature, the following 
factors can be identified as affecting the degree or possibility of cooperation in local 
organizations: 
   relative benefits of cooperation (over alternatives); 
   size of the user group;  
   users’ perceptions of time horizon;  
   degree of communication between players; 
   expectations; 
   degree of trust; 
   a willingness to try cooperation; 
   catalysts to start cooperation; 
   stability of the group; 
   existence of other cooperative structures; 
   non-anonymous relationship between members; and 
   content of social norms. 
 
Accordingly, there is a basis for local self-governed organizations to arise 
spontaneously and voluntarily in some situations, and they will be an effective solution for 
NRM.  Thus state regulation or privatization do not provide the only effective forms of - 23 - 
 
management for natural resources--there can also be a collective action sector in which 
resources are managed in common.  The importance of the distinction between a situation 
where the management takes place in the collective action sector and an open access situation 
is stressed by the "common property theorists" who argue that theorists of nationalization and 
privatization often are overlooking this important distinction.  Thus Bromley and Cernea 
(1989) suggest that what Hardin calls "The Tragedy of the Commons" should rather be called 
"The Tragedy of Open Access". 
 
6.  GAPS IN THE LITERATURE 
Despite the burgeoning literature related to local organizations for NRM, and despite 
the convergence between game theory and empirical synthesis studies, several critical gaps 
remain.  There will always be more natural resource management situations, and more 
organizations to be described and analyzed in detail.  The priorities for such work depends on 
whether these require further research to develop new principles and insights, or only require 
the application of existing principles.  For the purposes of both understanding the critical 
factors in group formation, and particularly for developing policies to encourage local 
organizational efforts to manage natural resources, a number of key areas merit further 
attention. 
Game theory has provided a number of important insights into the incentives for 
group formation and collective action.  The growing sophistication of game structures, as the 
artificial rules and structures of the games are modified to include norms, values, and other 
social factors, make the insights more applicable to the real world.  However, a major 
limitation of the games presented in this paper is that they still consider only a limited set of - 24 - 
 
possible strategies confronting the players.  As a result they do not capture the complexity of 
the numerous alternative strategies the users actually confront.  More refinement is also 
required to deal with implications for cooperation among large numbers of players, and for 
dealing with heterogeneity among actors.  While the games structures are evolving to take 
into account social interactions, they need to be further adapted to address the complexity of 
natural resource management situations. 
Even with the many empirical case studies and attempts to synthesize lessons from 
studies of local organizations, we are far from having ready prescriptions for successful 
NRM. One reason for this is the large number of dimensions and variables which need to be 
taken into account--with very few (if any) studies providing evidence on all of the critical 
dimensions.  Indeed, the number of variables and the ways in which they are measured 
appear to grow faster than the number of cases, so that little systematic analysis is possible.     
The lack of rigorous comparative research places a serious limitation to synthesizing 
and testing factors that affect organizations on the basis of empirical studies.  Particular case 
studies emphasize different factors as being critical to the success of certain local 
organizations, but they rarely provide enough information about other factors to be able to 
compare cases and generate or test alternative hypotheses.  We are therefore, out of 
necessity, left with drawing upon the expert opinion of each study’s authors as to what factors 
led to success or failure in each case.  As a result, many of the findings remain open to 
different interpretations. 
Part of the reason for the lack of such comparative research lies in the difficulty of 
operationalizing many of the key concepts relating to the resource base, the users, and the 
organizations themselves.  For example, it is difficult to measure "boundedness" of the - 25 - 
 
resource, or its predictability; the time horizon and leadership among the users; or procedures 
for monitoring and rules for sanctioning.  Even more basic concepts such as "size" of the 
resource unit, "heterogeneity" of the group, or property rights over the resource present 
complex problems to specify accurately enough to compare, particularly across different 
resources or geographic areas.  Development of indicators which apply across a broad 
spectrum of situations is still a great methodological challenge that needs to be met, if 
empirical work is to move beyond insightful, but idiosyncratic, studies. 
As difficult as it may be to measure the "independent" variables or factors affecting 
local organizations, the lack of consensus and coordination regarding indicators of 
organizational activity presents an even greater impediment to our understanding in this field.  
Researchers are often adept at identifying which are "good" organizations in the field, but it 
is much more difficult to specify what constitutes "good" (or "strong") organizations.  For 
example, does a high frequency of meetings indicate an active organization, or a high degree 
of conflict within the organizations?  A further complication lies in separating indicators of 
organization from resource management outcomes.  Thus, the degree of success in managing 
the resource is taken as an indicator of whether an organization is operating.  Alternatively, 
the activity of a local organization may be taken as an end in itself, without considering how 
effective it is.  If we are to understand the factors that affect local organizations, and the role 
of such organizations in NRM, we need to be able to distinguish between and measure the 
independent variables, the organizations themselves, and the outcomes for the resource base. 
While both game theory and empirical studies have shown that collective action is 
possible, further study of the limitations of voluntary local organizations would also be 
valuable.  There is a selection bias in the sample of LOs which have been studied, favoring - 26 - 
 
successful organizations.  Organizations which have failed, or locations in which collective 
action has not emerged are less likely to be examined.  Yet identifying the problems and 
barriers is also important for our understanding of how to facilitate local organizations. 
The policy focus has generally been missing in studies of local organizations.  That is, 
the factors affecting organizations and NRM are seen as given, without examining how they 
can be controlled or influenced.  This may lead to considerable academic insight, but has 
limited applicability to changing or improve resource management outcomes.  For this we 
need to identify and emphasize the "leverage points".  This particularly leads to further 
examination of the legal framework and state regulations.  The important question to address 
is what kinds of external support is helpful in strengthening local organizations, rather than 
taking over or undermining them.   
There is also insufficient understanding of how local communities shape not only the 
organizations and the resource management outcomes, but even environment in which they 
operate.  Although process documentation of action research traces out many of these 
linkages for particular cases, such feedback loops are missing from many conventional 
studies.  Policies, in particular, are too often seen as exogenously determined, without 
recognizing the effect of lobbying efforts by the organizations themselves.  Thus, in addition 
to internal dynamics, further attention to the external relations of local organizations is 
needed.  Indeed, one indicator of organizational effectiveness may be the extent to which 
they are able to influence state policies.   
While many studies have focused on traditional organizations, these do not represent 
the full range of LOs involved in NRM.  As states withdraw from attempts to manage natural 
resources at the local level, the role and complexity of LOs often increases.  Federations of - 27 - 
 
base-level organizations, for example, allow the users to coordinate between groups and 
manage resources over a larger area.  There are also more instances of joint management 
between government agencies and LOs.  Capturing the crucial features of such complex 
institutional arrangements requires going beyond the emphasis on internal arrangements and 
individuals’ incentives to participate in the groups, to give greater attention to inter-group 
relations. - 28 - 
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
There is now ample evidence showing that organizations are able to develop and be 
sustained spontaneously and voluntarily under certain circumstances.  Both the theoretical 
and empirical literature have turned attention to identifying the factors which affect the 
degree of organization, with a growing overlap between these in terms of the conditions for 
organization.   
Even though the PD game does not predict the emergence of voluntary organization, 
it draws attention to the importance of the property rights arrangements, which is also 
pointed out in the empirical literature.  Both the empirical literature and the more optimistic 
games share an emphasis on sociological variables.  The size of the group, shared norms, 
degree of communication, stability in the group, and perceptions of time horizon are 
identified as crucial factors conditioning voluntary organization.  Such convergence between 
theoretical and empirical literature increases confidence in the importance of these variables. 
Finally, one can ask what implications these conclusions have in terms of policy 
considerations.  First of all, the evidence of the possibility of voluntary organization indicates 
that extreme caution should be applied before moving to nationalize or privatize natural 
resources which can be managed as common property.  This does not mean that one should 
expect that local organizations will or can solve any collective action problem.  It should not 
be a pretext for the external agents such as politicians, public servants, national and 
international NGOs to do nothing.  Policy initiatives can be designed to reduce or remove 
potential physical-technical, sociological or institutional obstacles to local organization with 
the purpose of facilitating this process.  For this, knowledge of the factors which condition 
local organization should be applied as an analytical tool when exploring the policies to - 29 - 
 
support local organizations for natural resource management, both in general analysis and in 
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